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THE USE OF THE VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
TO INVALIDATE STATE LOYALTY OATHS
Baggett v. Bullitt
377 U.S. 360 (1964)
Following the Supreme Court's dismissal of Nostrand v. Little1 for
want of a federal question and the dissolution of an injunction staying the
enforcement of a loyalty oath requirement, the President of the University
of Washington issued a memorandum to all university employees notifying
them of their obligation to take an oath of allegiance.2 The faculty was
required to subscribe Oath Form A 3 and the staff (other than faculty) to
.1368 U.S. 436 (1962). One of the challenged oaths was the subject of prior
litigation involving two of the plaintiffs in the instant case. Professors Nostrand and
Savelle had previously attacked the 1955 oath and succeeded in having one severable
section declared unconstitutional. After remanding for a determination that the plain-
tiffs would be entitled to a hearing if dismissed for failure to take the oath, the
Supreme Court granted the Attorney General's motion to dismiss for want of a
substantial federal question.
2 The president based his authority to require oaths on the amended Subversive
Activities Act, Wash. Rev. Code § 9.81.070 (Supp. 1956), and the Code of Public
Instruction, Wash. Rev. Code §§ 28.70.150, 28.76.230 (1951). The Office of the
Attorney General provided two approved forms of oath. Oath Form A, infra note 3,
is composed of two sections; the first is an oath to support the constitution and the
second is a loyalty oath. The first section, required only for teaching personnel, has
been in effect since 1931 and is therefore intermittently referred to as "Oath Form A"
or the "1931 oath" both by the Court and in the body of this comment. The second
section, the loyalty oath, is obligatory for staff as well as teaching faculty and is based
upon a 1955 amendment to the Subversive Activities Act. This section is intermittently
referred to as "Oath Form B" or the "1955 oath." See Record, pp. 15-16, Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
3Oath Form A
STATE OF WASHINGTON
Statement and Oath for Teaching Faculty of the University of Washington
I, the undersigned, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support
the constitution and laws of the United States of America and of the State
of Washington, and will by precept and example promote respect for the
flag and the institutions of the United States of America and the state of
Washington, reverence for law and order, and undivided allegiance to the
government of the United States;
I further certify that I have read the provisions of RCW 9.81.010(2),
(3), and (5), RCW 9.81.060; RCW 9.81.070; and RCW 9.81.083, which are
printed on the reverse hereof; that I understand and am familiar with the
contents thereof; that I am not a subversive person as therein defined; and
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I am not a member of the Com-
munist party or knowingly of any other subversive organization.
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subscribe Oath Form B.4 All state employees had to affirm that they
were not "subversive" " or members of a "subversive organization" 6 or
"foreign subversive organization." 7 As a result, sixty-four members of
the faculty, staff, and student body of the University of Washington
brought a class action for a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality
of the two oaths and for an injunction against enforcement of the statutes
which supported the oaths by the President of the University, members of
the Washington State Board of Regents, and the State Attorney General.
A three-judge district court held that the 1955 oath-Oath Form B-
and underlying statutory provisions (which applied to all state employees)
did not infringe upon first and fourteenth amendment freedoms and were
not unduly vague. The 1931 oath-Oath Form A-which applied only
to teachers, was not examined because the Washington state courts had
not yet interpreted it; the district court abstained from examining the oath
and denied the request for a permanent injunction.8 The Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction "because of the public importance of this
type of legislation and the recurring constitutional questions that are pre-
sented by it." 9
In an opinion by Mr. Justice White, the United States Supreme Court
declared that the oath required by the 1955 statute was lacking in "terms
susceptible of objective measurement" and was unconstitutionally vague
because of the wide scope of its possible application. It could, for example
be used to prosecute editors of scholarly magazines who analyze manu-
scripts of Communist scholars, or teachers whose students are Communists.
Oath Form A was also held to be unconstitutionally uncertain because it
provided no ascertainable standard of conduct and because the statute
operated to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively pro-
tected by the Constitution. Its terms, even narrowly construed, abutted
upon sensitive areas of basic first amendment freedoms. If enforced, the
oath could prevent a professor or teacher from joining any group opposing
any current public policy or law or from even criticizing the state judicial
system.
The Court concluded by asserting that the abstention doctrine, re-
quiring a federal court to allow state courts to determine issues of
state law prior to federal adjudication, was not an automatic rule but
involved the discretionary exercise of a court's equity powers. The
determination of the validity of the 1931 oath prior to its interpretation
in state courts was justified by stating: "We doubt.., that a construction
I understand that this statement and oath are made subject to the
penalties of perjury....
Baggett v. Bullitt, stpra note 2, at 364 n.3 Cf. Wash. Rev. Code § 28.70.150 (1931).
4 Oath Form B is essentially the same as Oath Form A except that the first
paragraph is omitted. Supra note 2.
6 Wash. Rev. Code § 9.81.010(5) (1956).
6 Wash. Rev. Code § 9.81.010(2) (1956).
7 Wash. Rev. Code § 9.81.010(3) (1956).8 Baggett v. Bullitt, 215 F. Supp. 439 (1963).
9 Baggett v. Bullitt, 375 U.S. 808 (1963).
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of the oath provisions . . .would avoid or fundamentally alter the con-
stitutional issues raised in this litigation." 10
The importance of this case is hot to be found simply in the fact that
phrases such as "[lend] aid, support, advice or influence to the Communist
Party" and "promote respect for the flag and the institutions of the United
States of America and... undivided allegiance to the government of the
United States" are incapable of providing ascertainable standards of con-
duct or that they are composed of terms that are not susceptible of objective
measurement. The use of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to decide the
constitutional issue, the general subject matter of the statutes, and the
modification of the scienter requirement in loyalty oath cases combine to
give this decision far-reaching effects.
In deciding that the loyalty oaths required by the state of Washington
were "unduly vague, uncertain and broad," the Court again bypassed a
direct examination of the constitutionality of loyalty oaths for teachers."
Since Adler v. Board of Edue.1" it has been recognized that the states have
the right to establish qualifications for teacher employment. However, the
Court in Sweezy v. New Hampshire13 dearly acknowledged academic
freedom as a constitutionally protected right embodied in the free speech
guarantee of the first and fourteenth amendments. In four post-Sweezy
loyalty cases the Court has not reconciled the free speech needs of academic
freedom with a state's right to prevent subversives from adversely influenc-
ing students. 4 The Court has shown an awareness of the fact that oaths
can inhibit people from speaking or teaching freely; therefore, it has re-
quired that the oaths meet extremely strict standards of clarity as a means
of protecting this freedom of speech. These new standards involve both
the concept of "guiltless knowing behavior" and terms "susceptible of ob-
jective measurement." Exactly what these standards require is not yet
clear, but their application is certain to have a significant effect on the
void-for-vagueness doctrine as applied to statutes which may inhibit first
amendment freedoms and on loyalty oaths in general.
It has long been recognized that the void-for-vagueness doctrine or
the doctrine of unconstitutional uncertainty is inherently perplexing. "A
judgment that a statute does or does not provide the required definite-
ness is necessarily subjective." 1r The doctrine is of comparatively recent
origin; 16 the first statute found to be void for vagueness appeared before
10 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964).
11 See Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
12 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
13 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
14 See Elfbrandt v. Russell, 378 U.S. 127 (1964) ; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360
(1964) ; Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, supra note 11; Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960). See Morris, "Academic Freedom and Loyalty Oaths," 28 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 487, 490-510 (1963).
15 Collings, "Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal," 40 Cornell L.Q. 195
(1955).
16 Collings, supra note 15 ; Note, "Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in
Statutes," 62 Harv. L. Rev. 77 (1948). See generally Note, "The Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court," 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1960).
[Vol. 26
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
the Court in 1914.17 Starting at that time and continuing into the early
1930's, the only statutes declared unconstitutionally vague were those in
which the statutory language was so obscure that it failed to give adequate
warning and to provide proper standards for adjudication;' this was
held to be a violation of procedural due process of law.19 In 1931 the Court
first held a statute to be unconstitutionally uncertain because the language
was so broad and sweeping that it prohibited conduct protected by the
Constitution; it classified this as a violation of substantive due process.20
In the cases that followed,21 as in the principal case, no definite standards,
no meaningful criteria, were established by which the legislature could
"measure" the vagueness of a statute. Mr. Justice Frankfurter succinctly
stated the problem:
"[I]ndefiniteness" is not even a quantitative concept. It is not
even a technical concept of definite components. It is itself an in-
definite concept. There is no such thing as "indefiniteness" in the
abstract, by which the sufficiency of the requirement expressed by
the term may be ascertained.22
The requirement of extra specificity in statutes which may infringe
upon first amendment freedoms is well established and frequently applied 2 3
It is used to create a buffer-zone to protect the individual freedoms guaran-
teed by the first amendment. The importance of free speech as a means of
making the government responsive to the will of the people and of
securing social changes in a lawful manner has given it a preferred
position in relation to all other freedoms. In Cramp v. Board of Pub.
Instruction,24 as in the principal case, the Court indicated that these free-
doms need "breathing space" and then supplemented the existing require-
ments with an order that all oaths which may affect free speech must be
composed of terms susceptible of objective measurement.
17 International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914).
'8 See, e.g., United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921) ("the
section forbids no definite or specific act.") ; Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269
U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ("a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act
in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning... ') ; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 458 (1927) (statutes must
be framed "so that those to whom they are addressed may know what standard of
conduct is intended to be required.'); Champlin Ref. Co. v. Commission, 286 U.S.
210, 243 (1932) ("the exaction of obedience to a rule or standard that is so vague
and indefinite to be really no rule or standard at all.').
19 See Collings, supra note 15, at 196-97.
20 See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("might also be con-
strued to include peaceful and orderly opposition to government by legal means and
within constitutional limitation:').
21 See Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, supra note 11; Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507 (1948) ; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
22 Winters v. New York, supra note 21, at 524 (dissenting opinion).
23 See Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, supra note 11; Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147 (1959) ; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) ; see also Collings,
supra note 15, at 218-19; Note, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67, 75 (1960).
24 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
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The Court has not disclosed exactly what this new requirement means.
In Cramp the suggestion was made that "advocacy of violent overthrow
of state or federal governments" and "membership or affiliation with the
Communist Party" would be acceptable terms,25 but in Baggett v. Bullitt 2
the only additional clarification given was that the "measures which pur-
port to define disloyalty must allow public servants to know what is and
what is not disloyal." 27 By examining the phrases that the Court in
Baggett found to be vague 28 and comparing them with the two permissible
25 Id. at 286.
26 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
27 Id. at 380. (Emphasis added.)
28 THIS STATUTORY LANGUAGE
I "Subversive person" means any per-
son who teaches any person:
1. to commit any act intended to
overthrow the government by
revolution, force or violence.
2. to attempt to commit any act to
overthrow the government by
revolution, force or violence.
3. to aid in the commission of any
act to overthrow the government
by revolution, force or violence.
See Wash. Rev. Code § 9.81.010(5)
(1956).
II Revolution, force and violence...
See Wash. Rev. Code § 9.81.019 (2)
(1956).
III I will by precept and example pro-
mote respect for the flag...
See Oath Form A,
supra note 3.
IV ... and the institutions of the United
States of America and the State of
Washington.
Ibid.
MIGHT BE USED TO PROSECUTE
ANYONE WHO:
a. teaches or advises known members of
the Communist party.
b. by his teaching or advice may now
or at some future date aid the activ-
ities of the party.
See 377 U.S. 360, 367-68 (1964).
advocates peaceful but far-reaching con-
stitutional amendments, repeal of the
twenty-second amendment, or participa-
tion by this country in a world govern-
ment.
Id. at 370.
a. refused to salute the flag or advocated
refusal because of religious beliefs.
b. criticised the design or color scheme
of the flag.
c. unfavorably compared it with that of
a sister state or foreign country.
Id. at 371.
criticized his state judicial system, or the
Supreme Court or the institution of ju-
dicial review. It might be deemed to
proscribe advocating the abolition of the





phrases in Cramp, it is possible to arrive at a tentative determination
of what constitutes "terms susceptible of objective measurement."
The common characteristics found in the acceptable phrases and
absent in the unconstitutional phrases are that the conduct prohibited must
be direct rather than indirect, and the terms used must, on their face,
prohibit specific acts and no others. The conduct in which a teacher swears
not to participate must be his conduct. The state can, by means of an oath,
prevent A from teaching if he advocates the violent overthrow of the
government, but it cannot discharge him merely because his teaching is
beneficial to another who advocates the overthrow of the government by
force.2 9 According to Cramp and Baggett, states can require A to swear
that he is not a member of the Communist party but they cannot require
him to swear that he will not knowingly teach, aid, or advise members
of the Communist party.30
The terms of the oaths must be phrased in a manner that permits
only narrow application. They may require or proscribe certain conduct
only if the same phrases could not be used to prevent other, permissible
conduct. The two impliedly adequate phrases suggested in Cramp prohibit
actions that are objectively manifested and evident to everyone. Preventing
A from joining the Communist party does not prevent his joining other
groups which may be considered equally bad by some elements of society;
proscribing advocacy of the violent overthrow of the government does not
prevent A from teaching nuclear physics to a class of students, some of
whom are known Communists. On the other hand, the Court in Baggett felt
that phrases similar to "aid in the commission of any act to overthrow the
government by revolution, force, and violence" 3 1 encompassed both pro-
tected and prohibitable conduct. The phrase includes advocacy of unlawful
conduct, but it also includes constitutionally protected conduct such as
advocating participation by the United States in a world government.
3 2
This double edge makes the statute an unacceptably dangerous weapon.
These extracted indicia are all the Court has given to clarify its new
standard. If pursued, this criterion-that the terms of the oath must be
"susceptible of objective measurement"-as used by the Court could suc-
cessfully invalidate the teacher loyalty oaths required in thirty states.
33
V I will promote undivided allegiance a. gave lectures voicing far-reaching
to the government of the United criticism of any old or new policy
States. followed by the federal government.
b. allied himself with any interest group
dedicated to opposing any current
public policy or law of the federal
government.
Ibid. Id. at 371-72.2 O Supra note 28 at I.
30 Ibid.
31 Supra note 28 at II.
32 Ibid.
33An excellent compilation of loyalty oaths and loyalty oath requirements can
be found in Bryson, Legality of Loyalty Oaths and Non-Oath Requirements 53-94
1965]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The second standard imposed by the Court to obtain specificity in
oath statutes was the concept of "knowing but guiltless behavior." 34 This
involves the threat of a perjury prosecution for innocent conduct that the
actor knows might be beneficial to the Communist movement. Mr. Justice
Douglas, dissenting in Nostrand v. Little, described the application of this
test in Cramp by stating that the oath "was unconstitutional, because it
brought or might bring into its net people who, by parallelism of conduct,
might be said to have given 'aid' to the Communist Party though the cause
they espoused was wholly lawful." 35 Thus if a professor or administrator
invited a Communist scientist or scholar to the United States as a visiting
professor and his invitation was viewed as being beneficial to the Commu-
nist party, sufficient grounds might exist for his dismissal or prosecution.
Any phrase that is capable of -being read in this manner must now be
excluded from an oath. An example the Court gave was that the phrase
"knowingly lent their 'aid,' or 'support,' or 'advice,' or 'counsel' or 'in-
(1963). A survey of the oaths in the statutes of thirty-nine states discloses no ad-
ditional terms that would clearly survive the "objective measurement" test. A few
states require oaths that incorporate only the accepted phrases; an example is the
Kansas oath, Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 21-305 (1949):
I ........... swear (or affirm) that I do not advocate, nor am I a member
of any political party or organization that advocates the overthrow of the govern-
ment of the United States or of the state by force or violence; and that during
such time as I am an officer or employee of the ............, I will not advocate
nor become a member of any political party or organization that advocates the
overthrow of the government of the United States or of this state by force or
violence.
On June 15, 1964, in a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court vacated a judgment
of the Supreme Court of Arizona and remanded its interpretation of a teacher
loyalty oath for further consideration in the light of the principal case. The oath
remanded in Elfbrandt v. Russell, supra note 14, is as follows:
I ............. do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the
Constitution of the United States and the Constitution and laws of the State
of Arizona; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same, and defend
them against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and that I will faithfully and
impartially discharge the duties of the office of ................ according to
the best of my ability, so help me God (or so I do affirm).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 38-231(G) (Supp. 1964).
34 This phrase was first used by the Court in Cramp v. United States, supra
note 11:-"While it is perhaps fanciful to suppose that a perjury prosecution would
ever be instituted for past conduct of the kind suggested, it requires no strain of the
imagination to envision the possibility of prosecution for other types of equally guiltless
knowing behavior." Id. at 286. (Emphasis added.) In Baggett v. Bullitt, supra note
26, the Court said: "The susceptibility of the statutory language to require fore-
swearing of an undefined variety of 'guiltless knowing behavior' is what the Court
condemned in Cramp. This statute, like the one at issue in Cramp, is unconstituff6nally
vague." Id. at 368. (Emphasis added.) It was used for a second time in Baggett at 373:
"The hazard of being prosecuted for knowing but guiltless behavior nevertheless re-
mains." (Emphasis added.)
:, 35Supra note 1, at 437.
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fluence' to the Communist Party" 36 might be applied to a person who cast
his ballot for a Communist party candidate or a candidate supported by
the Communist party; to a lawyer who represented and gave legal counsel
to a known Communist, or to a journalist who defended the constitutional
rights of members of the party.3 7 If the phrase could conceivably be applied
in this manner it must be excluded because
the hazard of being prosecuted for knowing but guiltless behavior
nevertheless remains. "It would be blinking reality not to acknowl-
edge that there are some among us always ready to affix a Commu-
nist label upon those whose ideas they violently oppose. And ex-
perience teaches us that prosecutors too are human."8 8
If a statute meets the "objective measurement" test as analyzed and
developed above it would also satisfy the conditions imposed by the concept
of "guiltless knowing behavior." Both standards operate to require greater
specificity in loyalty oath statutes; yet they are not redundant. The former
can be used to test phrases or individual words such as "allegiance,"
"revolution," or "institutions"; the latter concentrates on the meaning of
phrases as they might possibly be applied by a school official or state
prosecutor. In addition, there are indications that the concept of "guiltless
but knowing behavior" might be used by the Court as a tool for modifying
the requirement of scienter in all loyalty oath cases.
Scienter, or knowledge of the nature of the offense, is one of the due
process requirements of loyalty oaths that prevents state authorities from
arbitrarily punishing innocent conduct. Before an affiant can be prosecuted
for subversive activity he must have had a conscious intent to be a part
of such activity; 31 before he can be discharged because of membership in
a subversive organization it must be shown that he had knowledge of the
nature and purpose of the organization.40 If scienter were not an essential
element, a teacher or other state employee could be discharged because
of innocent and unknowing conduct or for mere association with known
subversives.
The scienter requirement, implied in the early loyalty oath cases, 41
became express when in Wieman v. Updegraff the Court held that "in-
discriminate classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall as
an assertion of arbitrary power." 42 The recent cases, Cramp and Baggett,
38 This example was used by the Court in Cramp v. United States, supra note 11,
at 286; it was repeated in Baggett, supra note 26, at 367-68.
37 The fact that these examples include professions other than teaching might
be an indication that the Court will take a closer look at the oaths required for at-
torneys, labor organization officers, and candidates for public office.
38 Baggett v. Bullitt, supra note 26, at 373.
39 See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952).
40 Id. at 190.
41 See Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) ; Garner v. Board of Pub.
Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) ; Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
42 344 U.S. 183, 191.
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have refined "knowing activity" into "knowing but guiltless behavior"
and "knowing, guilty behavior." The Court's previous indications that
knowledge of the purpose of the organization or nature of the activity
would satisfy the scienter requirement have now been modified. Knowledge
by itself is insufficient; exactly what else is required is not yet clear. A new
concept, which combines the "specific intent" necessary for criminal prose-
cution that was required by the Court in Dennis v. United States 43 with
the element of "activity" formulated in Scales v. United States,44 seems
to be emerging. Although the Smith Act cases 45 are not controlling in
loyalty oath cases, the nature of the activity proscribed and the similarity
of statutory language 46 present comparable problems. Individual liberties
are protected in the former by requiring the government to show that the
person charged had knowledge of the nature of the activity, that he had
a specific intention to engage in it, and that he had actually carried out
his intention. These safe-guards were read into the statute because of the
possibility of imprisonment and severe fines. In the latter group it was
necessary to show only that the affiant had knowingly participated in an
activity or an organization that was "subversive." This was justified by
asserting that public employment was not an absolute right and by granting
the state the right to establish reasonable conditions of employment. How-
ever, an awareness by the Court of an increased number of "vigilance com-
mittees," 47 the possibility of loss of reputation and profession,4" and the
inhibiting effect of oaths on legitimate conduct and speech has resulted in
the present modification of the loyalty oath scienter requirement.
The concept that the Court is developing is negative in application
and indefinite in scope. An oath, to be valid, must be so phrased that the
language does not require the foreswearing of an undefined variety of
43 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
44 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
45 See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Scales v. United States,
supra note 44; Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) ; Dennis v. United States,
supra note 43.
46 The similarity of the legislative language can be vividly seen by comparing
§ 2 of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1958), which provides:
Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the duty,
necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the gov-
ernment of the United States . . . by force or violence ....
with Wash. Rev. Code § 9.81.010(5) (1956):
"Subversive person" means any person who commits . . . or advocates,
abets, advises or teaches by any means any person to commit . . . any act
intended to overthrow ... the constitutional form of the government of the
United States, or of the state of Washington . . . by revolution, force, or
violence....
47 In Cramp v. United States, supra note 11, at 286-87, the Court recognized this
influence when it observed: "It would be blinking reality not to acknowledge that
there are some among us always ready to affix a Communist label upon those whose
ideas they violently oppose. And experience teaches us that prosecutors too are
human." It repeated this statement in Baggett, supra note 26, at 373. See also Morris,
supra note 14, at 500.
48 See Baggett v. Bullitt, supra note 26, at 372.
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guiltless knowing behavior.49 This can presently be accomplished by re-
stricting the proscribed conduct to specific acts objectively manifested50
that are within the knowledge of the affiant at the time the oath is executed.
But if legislatures are forced to frame their oaths with narrow particularity,
"too easy opportunities are afforded to nullify the purposes of the legisla-
tion." rl Rather than an attestation of loyalty, the oath becomes an affidavit
that specified acts have not been and will not be committed. If an oath is
restricted to the two phrases that met with the Court's approval in Cramp,
it would include only those acts made criminal offenses under the Smith
Act. As such, it would be an ineffective means of preventing the subtle
and persistent influence a subversive teacher could have on the formative
minds of his students. A suggested alternative method of creating a valid
oath would be to recognize the possibility that aid might be given to the
Communist party or other subversive elements by acts that are otherwise
innocent, and to import a requirement of something more than knowledge
and action by the affiant.
The alternative of requiring a new element in addition to knowledge
and action involves ascertaining what is necessary to change guiltless
knowing behavior into guilty knowing behavior. The Court has indicated
that knowledge of the benefit to subversives by the commission of an act
is insufficient:
The Washington Supreme Court has said that knowledge is to be
read into every provision and we accept this construction ...
But what is it that the Washington professor must "know" ? Must
he know that his aid or teaching will be used by another and that
the person aided has the requisite guilty intent or is it sufficient
that he knows that his aid or teaching would or might be useful
to others in the commission of acts intended to overthrow the
Government? 62
An indication of what may be required is found in a footnote by the
Court to the principal case. Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting, pointed out the
similarity of the critical language used in the Smith Act and Oath
Form B.G3 The majority answered this assertion by stating:
It is also argued that § 2 of the Smith Act ... upheld over a
vagueness challenge in Dennis v. United States . . . proscribes
the same activity in the same language as the Washington statute.
The argument is founded on a misreading of § 2 and Dennis v.
United States....
In connection with the vagueness attack, it was noted [in Dennis]
that "[t] his is a federal statute which we must interpret as well as
judge. Herein lies the fallacy of reliance upon the manner in
which this Court has treated judgments of state courts... ." 4
49 Id. at 368.
50 See text accompanying notes 25-33 supra.
51 Winters v. New York, supra note 21, at 525 (dissenting opinion).
52 Baggett v. Bullitt, supra note 26, at 369.
53 Id. at 383 (dissenting opinion) ; see note 46 .supra.
54 Id. at 370 n.8.
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The similarity of the language is crucial and cannot be denied. In
Dennis the Court had a power of interpretation that it did not have in the
principal case. In Dennis the Court could add another element that it could
not supply by interpretation in Cramp and Baggett, and it did so when
it held that
the structure and purpose of the statute demand the inclusion of
-intent as an element of the crime. Congress was concerned with
those who advocate and organize for the overthrow of the Govern-
ment. Certainly those who recruit and combine for the purpose
of advocating overthrow intend to bring about that overthrow.
We hold that the statute requires as an essential element of the
crime proof of the intent of those who are charged with its viola-
tion to overthrow the Government by force and violence.55
The inclusion of specific intent as an essential element was sufficient
to safeguard the liberties of an individual charged with a criminal offense.
Since loyalty oaths are not criminal in nature it is conceivable that some-
thing more than knowledge but less than criminal intent would be adequate
to protect the affiant's rights and still provide an effective means for the
State to insure the loyalty of its teachers and employees.
One element that meets both of these requirements is proof of the
affiant's motive for his conduct.5 6 Proof of what induced a person to commit
an act that was beneficial to the Communist party or might aid in the
forceful overthrow of the government would not be as difficult to establish
as specific intent and would significantly reduce the possibility that a
teacher might be discharged for knowing but guiltless conduct. If it could
be shown that the motives of a professor who participated in an interna-
tional convention and exchanged views with Communist scholars or who
invited visiting professors from Communist countries were inconsistent
with the professional standards of the academic community, the State
would be justified in discharging that professor.
Professors, teachers, or other state employees-who, while acting
within the legitimate scope of their employment, knowingly aid the Com-
munist cause-would be conscious of the need to act reasonably and
with justifiable motives. This might enable a social science professor to
join an organization known to be subversive in order to study its oper-
ations, but it would arguably not allow a mathematics professor to join
for the same reason; the nature, necessity, and circumstances of the ac-
tivity become as important as the activity itself. A specific controversial
act itself would not be sufficient grounds for dismissal. Other factors,
55 Dennis v. United States, supra note 43, at 499. (Emphasis added.)
56 Cf. Black, Law Dictionary 1164 (4th ed. 1951):
In the popular mind intent and "motive" are not infrequently regarded
as one and the same thing. In law there is a clear distinction between them.
"Motive" is the moving power which impels to action for a definite result.
Intent is the purpose to use a particular means to effect such result. "Motive"
is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act.
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such as whether or not there is an academic justification for the act, how
often it was repeated, what the effect of the act was, become equally
important. At the initial oath-taking stage the affiant would not be re-
quired to foreswear any specific conduct. He would be required to affirm
that he would act in a manner consistent with academic or professional
standards and the burden would be on the state or university officials
to show that the conduct was undesirable and was not academically
justifiable. This new requirement would be a modicum of pressure ex-
erted upon state employees to prevent unnecessary benefits from accruing
to the Communist party and undue subversive influences from being ex-
erted upon impressionable students. Proof of the affiant's motive is a
compromise between the needs of the individual and the needs of the
state-to require less would be to inhibit innocent but knowing conduct;
to require more would be to deny to the state the right to establish
loyalty as an effective qualification for employment-and the Court has
not denied that the state has a valid interest to protect nor that it can
protect this interest by means of a loyalty oath.57
5 7 The requirement of the new element of "motive' in loyalty oath cases would
be consistent with the otherwise hasty disposition of the arguments for abstention
in the principal case. Normally a federal court will not pass on the constitutionality
of an uninterpreted state statute. Adler v. Board of Educ., supra note 41, at 496. The
Court's reason for doing so in Baggett was its belief that a construction or inter-
pretation of the oath provisions could not avoid or fundamentally alter the constitu-
tional issue. Undoubtedly the state court would not have implied the element of "mo-
tive" postulated herein, and the alternative of extreme specificity could not have been
readily provided by the state. The Court observed that, "It is fictional to believe
that anything less than extensive adjudications, under the impact of a variety of
factual situations, would bring the oath within the bounds of permissible constitu-
tional certainty. Abstention does not require this." Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360,
378 (1964). (Emphasis added.) Where, as here, no state court ruling could settle
the federal questions that would necessarily remain, and the likelihood existed that
the oath would again be before the court on the identical issue herein decided, absten-
tion would not be justified. Id. at 379. See also Public Util. Conun'n v. United Fuel
Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456, 463 (1943).
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